INTRODUCTION

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the associated demise of the communist bloc significantly reduced, if not virtually removed, the threat of a major nuclear conflict that had loomed for over four decades. Although the world no longer faces a serious risk of nuclear annihilation, new dangers stemming from the disappearance of the authoritarian controls that kept Soviet nuclear weapons and materials under tight custody—compounded by dire economic, social, and political conditions—threaten U.S. national security and global stability.

When the Soviet Union broke up at the end of 1991, about 30,000 nuclear weapons were spread among the former republics. In addition, Russia was (and still is) in possession of 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons agent. The human and physical infrastructure for developing and producing weapons of mass destruction remains mostly intact throughout the former Soviet Union. Although all of the tactical nuclear weapons were returned to Russia (the nuclear successor to the Soviet Union) by July 1992, about 3,200 strategic nuclear weapons were located outside of Russian territory in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine when these former republics became sovereign—and nuclear—states.

The situation in the new independent states (NIS) of the former Soviet Union has made it difficult, by their own admission, for the NIS to muster the resources required to dismantle their forces and dispose safely of the resulting fissile (or toxic) materials. Compounding this is the specter—reported with increasing frequency in the press—of a black market in weapon-usable materials. From these dangers of proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials to countries and groups inimical to U.S. and global interests, and the necessity for dismantling weapons that can be targeted against U.S. territory, came a requirement to help undo the militarily threatening remnants of the Cold War.

Four years ago, to address these concerns, the U.S. Government embarked on an ambitious and novel program of assistance sparked by a legislative initiative by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar. Under this program, coined the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program by the Clinton Administration, the United States is giving equipment and technical advice and training to Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to dismantle and destroy weapons of mass destruction, ensure safe and secure transportation and storage of nuclear warheads and materials in connection with warhead dismantlement, prevent proliferation, and transform their mass destruction-related industrial and military institutions into peaceful and productive assets.
threat. The following achievements in threat reduction all reflect implementation of the CTR Program conducted after January 1993:

--- return to Russia of over 2,000 strategic warheads from Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine,
--- complete denuclearization of Kazakstan,
--- Ukraine's decision to denuclearize and accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapons state, thereby enabling START to enter into force,
--- early deactivation of all SS-24 ICBMs and 1/2 of the SS-19 ICBMs in Ukraine,
--- re-employment of 8,000 former Soviet weapon scientists and engineers once engaged in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) projects on peaceful, civilian research projects,
--- purchase and transfer to the United States of 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium from poorly secured storage in Kazakstan (Project Sapphire),
--- safe and secure withdrawal to Russia of 63 of 81 SS-25 mobile ICBMs and launchers from Belarus, and
--- about 20 industrial partnership projects underway currently to convert NIS WMD factories to civilian production.

The CTR Program's successes in Ukraine since 1994 are representative of the payoff that has come from formulating and pursuing a realistic and consistent strategy. Despite Ukraine's pledge in the Lisbon Protocol (May 1992) both to adhere to START requirements and to become a non-nuclear-weapons state, the actual process and schedule for warhead removal to Russia—that is, denuclearization—was not agreed upon until the United States, Russia, and Ukraine concluded the Trilateral Accord in January 1994. Critical to the success of these negotiations was the U.S. promise of CTR assistance. In fact, the agreements to begin the CTR Program in Ukraine were not even concluded until December 1993, on the eve of the Trilateral Accord--two years after the Nunn-Lugar activities began.

One of the major reasons the CTR Program took off under this Administration was greatly improved program management and control. In May 1994, Secretary Perry directed the establishment of the CTR Program Office within the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy. The Program Office focuses the attention of a dedicated staff on effective and efficient implementation of CTR's objectives, which is especially important in light of the belt-tightening required throughout the Government.

Adding to this trend toward tighter management and implementation of the CTR Program was the development in 1994 of the first yearly CTR multiyear plan, which describes the details of a comprehensive program for carrying forward the momentum achieved toward reducing the threats associated with weapons of mass destruction in the NIS. This Program Plan is a requirements-driven document containing CTR activities and funding requirements beginning with FY96 and concluding with FY2001, when the CTR Program will be completed. The projects detailed in the Plan, like the ones underway today, are designed to accelerate by at least two years the current NIS strategic offensive arms elimination schedule. Additionally, these projects ensure safe and secure transportation and storage of nuclear warheads and fissile
SUMMARY OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS

The CTR Program can take credit for a number of important achievements that contribute to U.S. national security and global stability, and these successes, in turn, can be attributed mainly to the current Administration. In the wake of the 1991 Nunn-Lugar Congressional initiative, the Program yielded results slowly, owing partly to the complex and sensitive nature of the activities being undertaken, lingering Cold War suspicions, and the legal and administrative requirements levied by the U.S. Government.

Within several months after President Clinton took office on January 20, 1993, the Administration was able to increase the rate of obligations to Congress to the impressive levels that had been promised early on by Administration officials. At the end of January 1993, only $25.9 million had been obligated, but by the end of January 1994, obligations had increased over four-fold. By January of this year, cumulative obligations were nineteen times those of January 1993, and by the end of the past fiscal year obligations had reached over $860 million, or 33 times what they were when Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter and Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Harold P. Smith took office.

CTR OBLIGATIONS

Comparative obligation rates demonstrate the increasing level of effort but cannot tell the whole story. The successes and impact of the CTR Program under the current Administration can be illustrated most dramatically in terms of the central goal of the Program: Reducing the